UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPTNG OPERATIONS IN INTRASTATE CONFLICTS IN AFRICA: THE CASE OF SOMALIA

UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPTNG OPERATIONS IN INTRASTATE CONFLICTS IN AFRICA: THE CASE OF SOMALIA

Abstract:

Euphoria surrounding the Cold War’s demise and optimism about the possibilities for democratization have given way to a more sober appraisal of continuing and increasingly violent conflicts in “peace-time” that were hardly imagined by the framers of the U.N Charter The search for order may be no less quixotic at present than it was earliei as decolonization gives way to micro- nationalism and self-determination moves to its logical extrerru In inl intrastate conflicts in Africa such as Somalia, Angola, Mozambique, Sudan, and Liberia ethnic, religious and political cauldron see the, as well as fueling superpower rivalry. Intervention in such conflicts figures prominently in the policy lexicon and is the subject for numerous international symposium. Although geopolitics are never irrelevant, humanitarian prerogatives gave the U.N a the pure right to intervene, as was the case with Somalia. Actually, literature existing on intrastate conflicts is in the nature of case study; hence there is no statutory way of intervenl ion, and such different results obtained. We argued that with intrastate conflicts, the best means of resolution available to the U.N is the traditional non-violent peace-keeping operation. This concept is strictly based on “Consent” and “Cooperation” of the factions in conflict. With the special circumstances of the Somalia conflict, X the ground was provided for the U.N to set in motion its much acc1aimed concept of the ‘New World Order’ , which was seen stretching more and more to encompass a wider peace enforcement with little or no result. We argued that the Somalia conflict resulted from a deep rescission between Ali Mahdi and Farah Aid id. The U.N was to play the role of a Neutral International Mediator in Pacifying them based on what they want, and ought to have. With the special guerrilla nature of the conflict some amount of force was necessary, bu t o ne t o o p e r a te w i t h i n strict legal limit. Against this background by its resolution 794 (1992) the U.N, for the first time intervened military for humanitarian purposes. With continuous anarchy and reigning insecurity UNOSOM I could not adhesive its objectives . Acting under Chapter VII of the U.N Charter the Security Council adopted resolution 814 (1993). This was a gross violation of principles hither to established to guide the deployment of peace keeping missions. Developing countries were not blind to the unprecedented ” care-blanche” given the U.S in the furtherance of the mission In Somalia. Finally, by its Resolution 887 (1.993) UNOSOM II’s mission dramatically changed to one to re capture Farah Aidid, thereby sowing its seeds of discord. It is argued that, the U.N created unprecedented departures in its peace-keeping. Besides, it violated Somalia’s sovereignty once the “consent” boundary was crossed

UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPTNG OPERATIONS IN INTRASTATE CONFLICTS IN AFRICA: THE CASE OF SOMALIA